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The Effect of Child Support on
Selection into Marriage and Fertility
Daniel I. Tannenbaum, University of Nebraska
This paper studies the expansion of US child support policies from
1977 to 1992 and its consequences for marriage and fertility deci-
sions. I develop a model showing that child support enforces ex ante
commitment frommen to provide financial support in the event of a
child, which (1) increases premarital sex among couples unlikely to
marry and (2) reduces the abortion rate by reducing the cost of child-
rearing to single moms. Using variation in the rollout relative to the
timing of nonmarital pregnancy, I find that child support policies re-
duced the likelihood of marriage and reduced the abortion rate.
I. Introduction
Since the 1970s, the United States has dramatically strengthened the en-
forcement and collection of child support from nonresident parents. Begin-
ning in 1975 with part D of the Social Security Act and continuing with
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major legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, these statutes were enacted to pro-
tect children and ensure that nonresident parents, the majority of whom are
male, share in the burden of child-rearing.1
Child support laws also have the potential to affect individual decisions
regarding marriage and fertility. Child support laws ensure that mothers
can receive financial support for child-rearing without having to marry the
father; they also allow fathers to have a legal relationship with their child
without marriage. In addition, child support laws increase the cost of father-
ing a child, particularly an unwanted child, andmalesmay respondby reduc-
ing their fertility. Understanding the impact of child support laws on family
structure is of critical importance, not least because dramatic changes inmar-
ital patterns have coincided with a period of rapid child support expansion
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). To the extent that child support laws affect
marital formation, they also affect the family structure in which children
are reared, whichmay have consequences for their long-term chances of suc-
cess (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson 2002;
Bertrand and Pan 2013).
The analysis in this paper focuses on the marriage decision immediately
following a nonmarital pregnancy, sometimes referred to as a “shotgun”
marriage (Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996). There are two reasons for focus-
ing on this marriage decision. First, an influential paper by Akerlof, Yellen,
and Katz (1996) finds that the decline of marriages following an out-of-
wedlock pregnancy explains, in an accounting sense, the majority of the in-
crease in out-of-wedlock births between 1965 and 1990. Second, these mar-
riages are likely to be the most elastic with respect to child support laws: a
couple with a pregnancy decidingwhether tomarrywill consider what hap-
pens if they do not, a state of affairs governed directly by child support. Prior
to the child support era, if such a couple decided against marriage, the child
would have had no legal father. With a shotgun marriage, however, the hus-
band was (and still is) granted the presumption of paternity (Edlund 2013),
whichwas accompanied by custodial rights andfinancial obligations to sup-
port the child.2Hence, unmarried couples facing a pregnancy face a direct and
immediate trade-off among marriage, single motherhood, and aborting the
1 To provide a benchmark sense of child support’s reach and expansion, in fiscal
year 2013 there were 15.6 million child support cases and $31.6 billion of total dis-
tributed child support collections, compared with 4.1 million cases and $3.6 billion
in fiscal year 1978, valued in 2013 USD (source: Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment [OCSE], FY2013 Preliminary Report, table P-52, and Solomon-Fears 2005).
The majority of the increase in child support cases and collections has been among
children of never-married couples rather than of divorced couples (Freeman and
Waldfogel 2001).
2 A marriage after the birth of the child would have established the father as a
stepfather only, and if he desired to establish legal parental rights he would have
had to go through legal proceedings to formally adopt the child.
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pregnancy. I explore these mechanisms with a theoretical model that illus-
trates how child support may crowd out the commitment role of marriage.3
In the empirical analysis of this paper, I first show that child support laws
at the time of pregnancy have an effect on child support income receipt in
subsequent years formothers who do notmarry. Using variation in the tim-
ing of pregnancy relative to the rollout of child support legislative enact-
ments, I show that the full rollout of child support laws can account for
around a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of a never-married
mother receiving any child support income, off a base of 17%. The mean
dollar amount of child support received, conditional on receipt, is between
$2,000 and $3,000 per year (expressed in 2000 USD) and represents about
10%–15% of annual household income for these families. This evidence
is consistent with previous literature finding an effect of child support laws
on the mother’s income.4
Next, I consider the effect of child support laws on the marriage decision
following a nonmarital pregnancy. The empirical design is motivated by the
idea that the exact timing of conception relative to the child support legis-
lative rollout is difficult for the individual to control. To consider the effect
of child support on the marriage decision, I use variation in the spatial and
temporal rollout of state child support laws relative to the timing of non-
marital pregnancy. Themain specification assumes that propensity tomarry
evolves in the same way for women who are pregnant as it does for those
who are not. This assumption is later relaxed by allowing first a linear time
trend and then separate year interactions with pregnancy. I perform a vari-
ety of specification checks to demonstrate that the estimates are robust and
are not driven by a violation of common trends.5 All specifications support
3 Evaluating the welfare consequences of a child support policy for children re-
quires an understanding of both the potential negative effects on family structure
and the increased resources to single-parent households, an analysis that is beyond
the scope of this paper.
4 See, e.g., Beller and Graham (1991), Miller, Garfinkel, and McLanahan (1997),
Argys, Peters, and Waldman (2001), Freeman and Waldfogel (2001), and Sorensen
and Hill (2004).
5 First, I show that baseline characteristics, including both outcome variables and
controls, do not predict future innovations in child support laws, reducing the con-
cern for reverse causality. Second, I control directly for societal attitudes at the re-
gion level, which proxy for public sentiment on issues including premarital sex, sex
education, abortion, and the generosity of public assistance. Third, I show that the
estimates are robust to specifications allowing for differential trends related to base-
line state-level characteristics. Fourth, I allow the propensity to marry to vary flex-
ibly with time separately by pregnancy state; the main effect remains similar in sign
and magnitude but loses statistical significance. An F-test of the null hypothesis that
the interactions between year dummies and pregnancy state are jointly equal to zero
fails to reject, lending support to the main specification and mitigating concern that
differential trends in the propensity to marry by pregnancy state are driving the results.
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the interpretation that child support has reduced the likelihood of couples
marrying following a nonmarital pregnancy.
An important challenge for identification in this setting is selection: the
main regression is estimated under the assumption that child support poli-
cies are not affecting female fertility differentially based on her underlying
propensity tomarry. It is plausible, for example, that child support discour-
ages fertility among women who are most likely to marry. To explore this
possibility, I estimate the direct effect of child support on fertility and find
the estimates negative but small and insignificant, too small by an order of
magnitude to explain the estimated effects on shotgunmarriages.6 I also per-
form pessimistic counterfactual exercises that assign higher and higher mar-
riage rates to nonpregnancies and reestimate the main specification.
The regression estimates suggest that the full set of child support laws
adopted by US states over this period reduced the probability of a marriage
following a nonmarital pregnancy by about 7.7 percentage points, off a base
of 38%. This number is quite large compared with the total decline in the
fraction of nonmarital pregnancies resolved in amarriage before birth, about
10 percentage points over the 1977–92 sample period for which the child
support legislative data are available. These shotgunmarriages represent about
10% of all first marriages, and hence this effect is a relatively minor change in
marital patterns overall. However, the effect is large enough to have a sub-
stantial impact on nonmarital birth rates; a back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that a decline in shotgunmarriages of thismagnitude can account for
the fraction of nonmarital births increasing by about 2.7 percentage points,
relative to its total increase of 11% over the sample period.7
Next I estimate the effect on the state-level abortion rate, which is defined
as the number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–44 in a state-year.
Child support may affect the abortion rate by lowering the cost of raising
a child as a single mom. I show that the full set of child support laws reduced
the abortion rate by 1 to 2 per 1,000 women, relative to a base of 28. These
6 Aizer and McLanahan (2006) find a negative effect on total fertility for those
with a high school degree or less and slightly positive effects for those with some
college or more. This finding works against finding a negative effect on shotgunmar-
riages, however, since low-educatedwomen are less likely to have a shotgunmarriage
than high-educated women. The theoretical model presented in sec. III supports
their finding: those who are least likely to marry following a pregnancy reduce their
fertility the most. Both pieces of evidence suggest that the estimates presented in this
paper are a lower bound, in absolute value, of the true effect.
7 This calculation follows Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) and can be made as
follows. Define the shotgun marriage rate as the fraction of couples who marry be-
tween pregnancy and birth. Then the change in the fraction of children born out-
side marriage due to a change in the shotgun marriage rate, holding the fraction
conceived outside marriage fixed, is ð1 2 st11Þbt11 2 ð1 2 stÞbt11, where st repre-
sents the shotgun marriage rate at time t and bt11 represents the fraction conceived
outside marriage at time t 1 1.
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results again rely on the somewhat strong assumption of common trends,
which will be violated, for example, if state-level trends in attitudes toward
abortion and child support laws are correlated or jointly determined. For
this reason I control directly for attitudes toward the legalization of abor-
tion and the composition of state legislatures and governors’ offices. In ad-
dition, I subject the estimates to the same battery of specification checks and
robustness exercises as described above for the marriage estimates. The re-
sults hold up well.
This paper contributes to the literature studying long-termmarital trends,
including the decline of shotgun marriages (Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996;
Alesina and Giuliano 2006) and the rise of nonmarital births (Willis 1999).
Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) document the decline in marriage follow-
ing nonmarital pregnancies between 1965 and 1990 and show that this de-
cline accounts for themajority of the increase in births to unmarriedwomen
over this period. Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) present a theory in which
the availability of contraceptives and abortion can reduce shotgunmarriages.
This paper is complementary to their work, presenting both theoretical sup-
port and empirical evidence that child support is a key factor behind the dra-
matic decline in these marriages.8
Several studies find that child support laws have led to a decline in total
nonmarital births (Case 1998; Aizer and McLanahan 2006; Plotnick et al.
2007); Rossin-Slater (2017), on the other hand, finds that the adoption of in-
hospital paternity establishment programs reduces postbirth parental mar-
riage and hence increases nonmarital parentage. The theoretical model of
this paper rationalizes these findings. I show that a decline in total nonmar-
ital births can occur because men reduce fertility to avoid costly unwanted
births. However, conditional on a pregnancy, marriage rates decline and the
fraction of births that are born outside marriage increases. The empirical ev-
idence presented in this paper is consistent with this unified interpretation.
This paper also contributes to the literature studying determinants of the
abortion decision. Prior research has considered the role of the welfare sys-
tem (Moffitt 1998), Medicaid funding (Henshaw et al. 2009), and legal re-
strictions on providers (Haas-Wilson 1996; Joyce and Kaestner 2000). This
is the first paper, to my knowledge, to consider the effect of child support
laws on abortion rates. Moreover, there is little work in economics attempt-
ing to understand the causes behind the decades-long decline in the abortion
rate, which peaked in the early 1980s at 29.3 abortions per 1,000 women
aged 15–44 years but has subsequently declined to 19.6 as of 2008 (Jones
8 An important distinction between the Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) model
and the one presented in this paper is that Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) present
the decline in shotgun marriages as welfare diminishing for marginal women who
no longer marry, while here it is welfare enhancing for these women because they
receive additional transfers outside marriage.
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and Kooistra 2011). This paper provides evidence that child support is an
important factor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief
overview of the child support process and describes the legislative data used
in the empirical analysis. Section III presents a conceptual framework to ex-
plore mechanisms and consider welfare consequences. Section IV describes
the data andpresents summary statistics and empirical trends. SectionVpres-
ents the identification strategy, the main results, and robustness exercises.
And section VI concludes.
II. Background on Child Support
The first major federal policy affecting child support was the creation in
1975 of part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, which created the fed-
eralOCSE.9 The primary purpose cited in these laws is twofold: to promote
the best interests of the child by promotingfinancial stabilitywithin families
and to decrease dependence on public assistance.
The child support process.—At the individual level, the child support pro-
cess begins with paternity establishment. If themother ismarried at the time
of birth, the husband is presumed to be the father. If the mother is unmar-
ried at the time of birth, the state or child support agency will attempt to de-
termine paternity, according to the state laws in effect. There have been sig-
nificant changes in the procedure for establishing paternity since the 1970s.
In 1978, 111,000 paternities were established, increasing to 1.6 million in
1999 (Committee on Ways and Means 2014).10
If paternity is not established or presumed, a biological father has no rights
or obligations to his child. From a legal perspective, the child and biological
father are strangers. For centuries, governments and church parishes have
attempted to reduce their welfare rolls by locating absent fathers and getting
them to financially contribute—a notable early example is the 1576 Poor
Law of England. In practice, paternity establishment has been revolution-
ized by late 20th-century developments in technologies that assist in identi-
fying, or ruling out, a potential father, such as blood typing and genetic testing
(US Department of Health and Human Services 2002).11
9 Lerman and Sorensen (2003) provide a useful overview of child support en-
forcement. See also Committee onWays andMeans (2012), which has a concise leg-
islative history of federal laws regarding child support.
10 Federal laws began imposing minimum paternity establishment rates on states
in 1988: initially set at 50%, it has been incrementally increased to 90%, as man-
dated by the 1996 welfare reform law. A provision of the Family Support Act of
1988 requires states to pay the up-front cost of genetic testing and to mandate a ge-
netic test in a contested paternity case at the request of any party. Most states now
have in-hospital Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity programs, which pre-
sent acknowledgement forms to the man accompanying the mother in the hospital
at the time of birth (Rossin-Slater 2017).
11 For divorced couples—i.e., cases in which paternity is not legally in doubt—
child support orders have been a component of alimony since before the 1975
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Once paternity is established, the next stage of the child support process
is to obtain a child support order. The process for obtaining a child support
order has been transformed and streamlined since 1975. If the mother is a
recipient of public aid (IV-D cases), the IV-D agency will initiate child sup-
port proceedings against the person alleged to be the father, beginning with
paternity establishment and through securing a child support order. Amother
who is not a recipient of public aid has to bring a child support action to
court herself, beginning with a paternity action and followed by a petition
for child support. The child support order itself specifies the monthly child
support amount, after consideration of the parents’ income sources and the
state guidelines for child support payments. The child support order will
also specify the method of payment, which nowmay include wage garnish-
ment or automatic withholding from public assistance, such as unemploy-
ment benefits, Social Security income, or tax returns.
III. Model
This section presents a simple model to explore both the mechanisms and
the welfare consequences of a child support policy for the mother and fa-
ther.12 Some predictions are straightforward; for instance, that women
whowould be single momswithout child support are better off with a child
support transfer.Other predictions aremore subtle: for example, thatwomen
who would have a child and marry regardless of child support (and hence
never use it) are better off, or that some men benefit from child support be-
cause it creates an ability for them to commit to future transfers, which they
could not credibly do before. Unlike prior models of child support (Aizer
and McLanahan 2006; Rossin-Slater 2017), the framework here endogen-
izes both marriage and fertility decisions, making it better suited to study
the effect of child support on total nonmarital fertility separately from the
fraction of births that occur outside marriage. The model also introduces
abortion as a third alternative to marriage and single motherhood.
A. Model Setup
There exists a continuum of men and women who derive utility from one
private composite good c, from sex, and from children.13 Individuals live for
two periods and discount the future by a factor b.
Men and women are heterogeneous in their preference for children. Let
vF denote a woman’s individual-specific preference for children, assumed to
be distributed over a support ½2V,V with distribution GF, and let vM
federal law, although data on the frequency of payments or compliance with these
orders prior to the creation of the OCSE are difficult to find.
12 I leave aside the equally important consideration of the welfare of the child,
which is beyond the scope of this paper but is discussed in Rossin-Slater (2017).
13 For simplicity, we consider the choice between having one child and none, al-
though the framework easily generalizes to the case of multiple children.
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denote a male’s preference for children, distributed over the same support
with distributionGM. Taste parameters for children are assumed to be per-
fectly observable to both partners.
Information is perfect: all parameter realizations, including one’s own
value of children and one’s partner’s value of children, are perfectly known
and are known at the start of the game.
In period 1, all men andwomen are single and childless and arematched at
random into couples.Men andwomen receive period 1 utility from sex only,
which generates a fixed surplus b > 0 for each partner. Period 1 utility is
simply Ui 5 bsi for i ∈ fM, Fg, where si is an indicator for having premar-
ital sex; individuals receive no wages and have no private consumption in
period 1.
At the beginning of period 2, couples find out if there is a pregnancy,
which occurs with exogenous probability l if the couple had premarital
sex in period 1. Women can abort the pregnancy at individual-specific cost
d distributed over support R1, which encapsulates any psychic, distance, or
monetary costs and is perfectly observable to both partners.
Men and women receive period 2 utility from the private consumption
good and from children. In this simple setup, women are assumed to be the
default custodian of their children, and by assumption they derive equal util-
ity from children whether or not they aremarried. Female utility in period 2
is written UFðcF , k, aÞ 5 uðcFÞ 1 vFkð1 2 aÞ 2 da, where cF denotes con-
sumption of the private good, normalized to have unit price; k is a dummy
variable indicating a pregnancy; a is a variable indicating if the pregnancy is
aborted; and u() is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave.
Men receive vM from children if they are married, which is diminished by
a factor a if they are not married, where 0 < a < 1. This assumption reflects
the lessened custodial rights of fathers outside marriage or a father’s emo-
tional distance from living away from his child (Chiappori and Oreffice
2008; Edlund 2013; Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss 2014). Period 2 male
utility in marriage is UMðcM, k, aÞ 5 uðcMÞ 1 vMkð1 2 aÞ and outside mar-
riage isUMðcM, k, aÞ 5 uðcMÞ 1 avMkð1 2 aÞ. I emphasize that cM and cF are
not constrained to be the same inside and outside marriage.
In period 2, men earn wages wh. Women earn wh too unless they have a
child, in which case they earn w‘ < wh, reflecting both diminished earnings
due to time away from work and the cost of raising the child (Bertrand,
Goldin, and Katz 2010). Women who choose to abort the pregnancy keep
their full wages in period 2.
B. Timing of Marriage and Fertility Decisions
In period 1, the couple decides on premarital sex. If both partners agree to
premarital sex, thenwith probability l the female partner becomes pregnant
at the beginning of period 2. (The game endswith outside options if the cou-
ple decides not to have sex.)
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In period 2, if there is no pregnancy there is no surplus ofmarriage, and the
game ends with outside options. If there is a pregnancy, the couple decides
on marriage; if both partners agree, they marry and bargain over marriage
allocations; otherwise, they remain single.14 If the couple remains single,
the female decides whether to abort the pregnancy.15 Note that bargaining
overmarriage allocations occurs at a timewhen the female partner considers
abortion as one of her outside options.
Married couples bargain to a Pareto-efficient outcome: if both partners
cannot be made better off under marriage, they do not marry. If both part-
ners can bemade better off undermarriage, the couplemarries and consump-
tion is allocated to maximize weighted utility subject to both partners being
better off, with a weight of 1 on the female partner and m onmen (Browning,
Chiappori, and Weiss 2014).
The model is solved by backward induction in appendix A (apps. A–D
are available online).
C. Child Support
Themain focus here is the impact of a child support policy: a government-
enforced lump sum transfer t > 0 from the father to the mother in the case
of nonmarital fertility.16 I impose one further assumption about the size of t:
that t is small enough so that at least some men with distaste for children—
that is, some men with vM < 0—are still willing to have premarital sex.
The main implications of introducing a child support policy are summa-
rized with the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. If a child support policy is introduced, the following occur:
1. Strictly fewer women have an abortion, conditional on pregnancy.
2. Womenwhomarry following a nonmarital pregnancy enjoyweakly
more private consumption.
3. The effect on total pregnancies is ambiguous.
4. A set of couples unable to commit to marriage will have premarital
sex.
14 The timing of marriage and fertility decisions in the model is such that all mar-
riages are “shotgun marriages” in the sense that they are triggered by the pregnancy
and would not occur otherwise. One could include an additional match-specific
nonmonetary benefit of marriage v, as in Chiappori andWeiss (2006), which would
introduce both shotgun and nonshotgun marriages.
15 Because children are the only surplus of marriage and preferences for children
are public, no abortions will occur in marriage.
16 An important feature of child support is to provide additional custodial rights
to the father, which would be represented here by an increase in a for nonmarried
fathers; I consider this case in app. A.
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Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows. Under a child support
policy, strictly fewer women abort a pregnancy because being a single mom
is more attractive with added financial support from the father. Married
women have greater bargaining power in their marriage because their out-
side option—being a single mom—is now more attractive, raising the pri-
vate consumption required for them to marry. The total effect on pregnan-
cies is ambiguous because while women’s willingness to become pregnant
increases, men who dislike children are less willing to have premarital sex.
However, a set of couples who previously faced a commitment problem
will now have premarital sex and will not marry. Prior to child support, a
set of men were willing to commit ex ante to future transfers to have pre-
marital sex, but this commitment was not credible; ex post these menwould
walk away. The commitment problem is solved by child support, which en-
forces commitment from men in couples who will not marry.
D. Welfare
All women are at least weakly better off by the introduction of child sup-
port.Womenwhomarry haveweakly higher bargaining powerwithinmar-
riage.Marginal womenwho prior to child support would have sex onlywith
commitment and now will have sex without commitment to marry are bet-
ter off too, because they receive higher consumption inmarriage and receive
the utility benefit of sex. Inframarginal women who, prior to child support,
would have sex without commitment are strictly better off too because they
now receive child support payments in the event of a nonmarital pregnancy.
Women who continue to reject premarital sex are no worse off than they
were prior to the reform.
Let us now consider men. Men who can credibly commit to marriage
(vM > 0)—are weakly worse off because they have weakly lower bargaining
power in marriage. Some men are weakly better off: those for whom child
support solves the limited commitment problem. These men are better off
because without child support they were willing to commit ex ante, but ex
post they would walk away; child support enforces commitment from these
men.
It is important to emphasize that in this model child support is welfare
enhancing for the marginal womenwho no longer marry. This is in contrast
to the shotgunmarriagemodel ofAkerlof, Yellen, andKatz (1996), inwhich
a decline in shotgun marriages is welfare diminishing for these marginal
women.17
17 The decline in shotgun marriages in the Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) model
arises as a result of a new technology—contraceptives and abortion—which is adopted
by an exogenous fraction of women. The adoption of this technology by a large
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V. Data Sources
This section describes the data sources and presents descriptive statistics.
A. Child Support Legislative Data
This study uses a state-year database of child support legal enactments,
used in prior work by Case (1998) and Plotnick et al. (2007) and which in-
cludes laws at each stage of the child support process.
These data are available for the years 1977–92 and for all US states with
the exception ofHawaii andAlaska. I construct a state-year legislative index,
denoted CSst, which is an average of nine indicator variables, each of which
represents a different child support law and takes the value of 1 if the asso-
ciated law is in effect in state-year st. Hence, the index is a continuous var-
iable ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 reflects that the state has none of the nine
laws in effect and 1 reflects that the state has all nine laws in effect. A single-
dimensional index increases power in the analysis and allows us to draw
inferences about the aggregate impact of the rollout, but it has the disadvan-
tage of imposing linearity so that each law is assumed to have the same mar-
ginal effect, abstracting away from any heterogeneity in their impact. I ex-
plore heterogeneity in the main results in appendix B.
The nine laws included in the analysis are (1) a law requiring immediate
incomewithholding for newormodified child support cases, deducting child
support obligations from the obligor’s paycheck; (2) a law allowing the cus-
todial parent to place a lien on the noncustodial parent’s property; (3) a law
permitting genetic tests to be used to resolve disputed cases; (4) a law allow-
ing paternity to be established while the child is below 18 years of age; (5) a
law requiring the provision of local child support collection and enforce-
ment services to nonrecipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC); (6) a law requiring withholding of arrearages from parents who
are delinquent on their payment; (7) a law creating criminal penalties for
failure to pay child support; (8) a law establishing the right to bring a child
support action against a parent residing in another state; and (9) a law cre-
ating a central registry for child support payments.
Figure 1 plots the mean adoption rate across states for each of the nine
different child support statutes used in the analysis. The figure shows a dra-
matic increase in adoption of statutes and considerable variation in the timing
enough fraction of women induces the shotgun marriage equilibrium to switch to a
second equilibrium in which men no longer have to promise to marry as a means
for obtaining premarital sex. The exogenous fraction of women who fail to adopt
the new technology are worse off because they can no longer extract a shotgun mar-
riage promise and no longer marry. In the model presented here, by contrast, the
marginal women are better off because they get additional transfers by not marry-
ing their male partners.
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and abruptness of enactments across states. While incremental changes to
child support collection and enforcement have taken place since the 1970s,
with the gradual trend being toward greater enforcement and stronger mea-
sures to promote collection, certain federal laws brought abrupt changes,
which can account for the dramatic rise in certain types of laws. For exam-
ple, in 1984 Congress enacted Public Law 98-378, which required states to
implement income withholding procedures for parents delinquent on pay-
ments, and hence in figure 1 we see a big jump in state laws withholding for
delinquency between 1984 and 1986. Similarly, Public Law 100-485was en-
acted inOctober of 1988 and implemented income withholding procedures
that would take effect immediately, unless the parties were able to come to
an alternate arrangement; figure 1 shows a spike in state laws introducing
immediate withholding between 1988 and 1990.18
FIG. 1.—Child support statute adoption. This figure plots the mean rate of adop-
tion across states for each of the nine types of child support statutes used in the
analysis. AFDC 5 Aid to Families with Dependent Children. A color version of
this figure is available online.
18 Accompanying the strengthening of policies, child support enforcement ex-
penditures per single mother roughly tripled between 1980 and 2000, from $200
per single-mother family to approximately $600, in constant 2000 USD (Freeman
and Waldfogel 2001).
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B. Child Support Income Data
Child support income data come from the Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series March Current Population Survey (CPS; Flood et al. 2017).19
Figure 2 shows that child support income increased substantially over
this period.20 The series plotted on the left Y-axis shows the fraction of
FIG. 2.—Child support income receipt. This figure plots two annual series: (1) the
fraction of never-married mothers with an absent father receiving any child support
income and (2) mean child support income received (in 2000 USD) for those receiv-
ing any child support. Source: March Current Population Survey. A color version of
this figure is available online.
19 TheMarch CPS has an advantage over alternative data sources recording infor-
mation about child support in that it offers the longest time series, allowing one to
observe whether a mother received any child support going back to 1977. By con-
trast, the April CPS Child Support Supplement was introduced in 1979 and has
been repeated every other year since 1982. SIPP, which also records information
about child support receipt, has its earliest sample in 1984. The March CPS has the
disadvantage of not containing information on child support awards or amount owed
by the nonresident parent.
20 For years 1977–87 I use the GOTALCH variable, which is an indicator for the
respondent having received alimony or child support income over the past year. I
use the sample of never-married women only; hence, a positive response indicates
child support income, not alimony. The March CPS began collecting data on child
support as a separate income category in 1988, and I use this CSINCOME variable
for 1988 and later years.
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never-married mothers with a custodial child under 18 and an absent father
who report receiving any child support income for years 1976–2010. The se-
ries plotted on the right Y-axis shows the average annual pretax child sup-
port income (in 2000 USD) for those reporting any child support income.
The second series shows that the dollar amount received per mother has
been steadily increasing over the sample period, and the amount represents
between 10% and 15% of total household income for mothers in the sam-
ple. (I omit the period 1977–87 from this second series because it is not pos-
sible to separate child support income fromother residual income categories
in this period.)
Note that in spite of the dramatic increase in the fraction of never-married
mothers receiving child support from 1980 to 2000, the fraction never sur-
passes 25%. This may reflect underreporting of income, which has been
documented in the March CPS for child support and other transfer pro-
grams and appears to be more pronounced among lower-income respon-
dents (Wheaton 1997; Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2015; Meyer and Mittag
2019).21
C. Marriage and Fertility Data
The marriage and fertility data used in the main analysis come from the
restricted Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which is
available in the Census Bureau’s Research Data Center. I use years 1992,
1993, and 1996, which have retrospective marital and fertility histories in
TopicModule 2 as well as state identifiers and individual demographic con-
trols. The state of residence identifier in SIPP allowsme to link these data to
the state-level child support legislative data.22
I emphasize that the restricted SIPP does not include data onmiscarriages
or abortions; hence, the analysis of marriage following a first pregnancy is,
more precisely, an analysis of marriage following a pregnancy that results in
the first live birth reported by the respondent.23
Table 1 displays sample means and standard deviations for the SIPP sam-
ple. The sample includes women aged 18–44 in each time period given in the
column heading. I define a shotgun marriage as a first marriage occurring
21 In terms of dollar amounts, according to the OCSE’s 2000 annual report, the
amount of current support due in fiscal year 2000 was $23.03 billion, while the
amount of current support distributed was $12.9 billion, or 56% of the total.
22 Note that all reported numbers of observations and degrees of freedom in
F-statistics that come from the restricted SIPP data are rounded according to census
disclosure requirements.
23 For conciseness, throughout the empirical analysis using SIPP data, I use the
term “pregnancies” to refer to pregnancies that result in a birth. Section V.C con-
siders the direct effect of child support on abortions using aggregated data at the
state-year level. Section V.D considers the potential for selection bias in the mar-
riage analysis that may occur due to missing data on miscarriages and abortion.
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between 0 and 8 months prior to the first birth, following Akerlof, Yellen,
and Katz (1996). Figure 3 shows a 3-year moving average of the shotgun
marriage rate: the fraction of year t nonmarital (first) pregnancies resolved
in amarriage 0–8months prior to birth.24 The shotgunmarriage rate is more
than 50% in 1970 and declines to slightly more than 20% in 1996.25 It is
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
All Years 1977–80 1981–84 1985–88 1989–92
Person characteristics:
Shotgun marriage rate .36 .38 .39 .36 .33
(.48) (.48) (.49) (.48) (.47)
Fraction of marriages: shotgun .10 .09 .11 .10 .11
(.30) (.29) (.31) (.30) (.32)
Fraction of pregnancies: nonmarital .31 .26 .29 .32 .35
(.46) (.44) (.45) (.47) (.48)
Fraction of births: nonmarital .21 .18 .19 .22 .25
(.41) (.38) (.39) (.41) (.43)
Child support:
Child support index .46 .19 .27 .64 .78
(.29) (.13) (.13) (.15) (.12)
Child support expenditures (2000 USD) 223.62 179.07 179.65 218.94 287.87
(111.82) (95.53) (92.22) (102.67) (113.00)
State-level controls:
Percent black .12 .12 .12 .12 .13
(.08) (.07) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Male unemployment rate .08 .07 .10 .07 .07
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Females with college degrees .44 .42 .43 .44 .46
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Female labor force participation .64 .59 .63 .66 .69
(.06) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Urban .72 .69 .70 .74 .75
(.22) (.23) (.23) (.22) (.21)
Welfare .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Single-mom welfare .10 .10 .10 .10 .09
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Poverty .13 .12 .14 .14 .13
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
NOTE.—This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the marriage data from the
restricted Survey of Income and Program Participation, the child support legislative data, and the state-year
controls. The shotgun marriage rate is defined as the fraction of nonmarital pregnancies (resulting in births)
that are resolved in a marriage between 0 and 8 months prior to birth. Nonmarital pregnancy refers to the
fraction of women with a nonmarital conception resulting in birth.
24 Because only live births are observed, the shotgun marriage rate is computed as
the fraction of women who are never married as of 9 months prior to their first
birth who become married between 0 and 8 months prior to the birth.
25 The decline in shotgun marriages presented here is consistent with Akerlof,
Yellen, and Katz (1996) and complements the empirical finding in the sociology
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important to stress that the decline in shotgun marriages preceded
the strengthening of child support laws by about 5 years; hence, the decline
cannot be explained completely by the advent of child support laws.26 Fig-
ure 3 also plots the fraction of total first marriages in year t that are shotgun
marriages, showing a broadly stable fraction until the early 1990s and then
declining.27
FIG. 3.—Shotgun marriage rates by year. The figure uses data from the restricted
Survey of Income and Program Participation and plots 3-year moving averages of
the following two series: (1) the fraction of first births that are resolved in a mar-
riage 0–8 months before birth, plotted on the left Y-axis, and (2) the fraction of first
marriages that are shotgun marriages, plotted on the rightY-axis. A color version of
this figure is available online.
literature that since the 1970s, pregnancies outside marriage are far more likely to be
resolved in cohabitation rather than marriage (Lichter, Sassler, and Turner 2014).
26 Child support was introduced in part as a response to the increase in the num-
ber of single-mother families on welfare. While child support may have succeeded
in reducing welfare receipt among single moms (Huang, Garfinkel, and Waldfogel
2004), this paper argues that it may have had the unintended consequence of actu-
ally increasing the fraction of single-mother families, through its effect on the mar-
riage decision.
27 Appendix D presents additional descriptive analysis of shotgun marriages,
based on the National Survey of Families and Households and SIPP, showing that
they differ qualitatively from nonshotgun marriages in terms of marital happiness
and divorce hazard rates. People in shotgun marriages are less likely to report being
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D. Abortion Data
State-year data on abortion totals and the number of abortion providers
come from the Guttmacher Institute and are based on periodic surveys of
abortion providers (Henshaw and Kost 2008). The data report total abor-
tions and abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–44, both by state of residence
and by state of occurrence, and are available for years 1978–2008, with gaps
in years 1983, 1986, 1989, and 1990 in the analysis period. I use abortions by
state of residence rather than state of occurrence since child support laws
will affect women by their state of residence. The data also include counts
of the number of abortion providers in each state and year; these include
hospitals, clinics, or physicians’ offices where abortions are performed. I use
these counts to construct a proxy for abortion availability: the number of
abortion providers per 100,000 women aged 15–44.
Figure 4 depicts trends in total abortions and in the abortion rate, which is
defined as the number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–44. The de-
cline in the abortion rate over 1978–92 continues until about 2004, although
the child support legislative database does not cover such recent years.
FIG. 4.—Trends in abortions in the United States. A color version of this figure
is available online.
happy in their marriage, are more likely to report having discussed separation with
their spouse, and are more likely to divorce.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics: Guttmacher, General Social Survey (GSS), and State
Legislature Data
All
Years 1977–80 1981–84 1985–88 1989–92
Abortion statistics:
Number of abortions per 1,000 women 27.68 28.65 28.56 27.24 25.86
(10.57) (9.82) (10.55) (11.08) (10.67)
Number of abortion providers
(per 100,000 women) 4.82 5.31 5.18 4.56 4.06
(2.90) (3.01) (2.98) (2.82) (2.54)
Societal attitudes:
Abortion legal for any reason .43 .40 .42 .41 .47
(.11) (.12) (.12) (.10) (.11)
Abortion legal if not married .46 .47 .47 .43 .49
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.09) (.11)
Abortion legal if married .46 .47 .48 .44 .48
(.11) (.11) (.12) (.10) (.12)
Abortion legal if woman’s health endangered .90 .91 .90 .89 .92
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Abortion legal if pregnant as a result of rape .82 .81 .82 .80 .85
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Abortion legal if strong chance of birth defect .81 .83 .81 .79 .82
(.07) (.05) (.05) (.07) (.09)
Abortion legal if low income .49 .52 .50 .45 .52
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.11)
Premarital sex OK .50 .48 .49 .52 .49
(.10) (.08) (.10) (.11) (.11)
Should divorce be easier to obtain .31 .35 .27 .30 .32
(.09) (.09) (.08) (.08) (.10)
Sex education in public schools .90 .85 .90 .91 .92
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.04)
US spends too much on welfare .45 .58 .46 .42 .37
(.12) (.08) (.07) (.10) (.11)
State legislature composition
(house-senate-governor):
D-D-D .38 .53 .38 .36 .27
(.49) (.50) (.49) (.48) (.44)
D-D-R .32 .22 .34 .30 .40
(.47) (.41) (.47) (.46) (.49)
D-R-D .14 .08 .10 .18 .21
(.35) (.28) (.30) (.38) (.40)
D-R-R .04 .01 .05 .04 .04
(.19) (.12) (.22) (.20) (.20)
R-R-R .04 .05 .05 .03 .02
(.19) (.22) (.21) (.18) (.15)
R-R-D .05 .05 .06 .05 .03
(.21) (.21) (.24) (.21) (.17)
R-D-R .02 .02 .02 .03 .01
(.14) (.15) (.15) (.16) (.09)
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the abortion data over the sample
period used in the analysis. Total abortions declined from 28.7 per 1,000
women per year in the 1978–80 period to 25.9 in the 1990–92 period. This
downward trend has been accompanied by a downward trend in the num-
ber of abortion providers per 100,000 women aged 15–44, from 5.3 in the
1977–80 period to 4.1 in the 1990–92 period.
E. State-Year Controls, Societal Attitudes,
and Political Affiliation Data
The state-level demographic controls come from theMarch CPS. Table 1
presents summary statistics of the mean and standard deviations of state-
level controls used in the main analysis, including percent black, male un-
employment rate, share of college degree holders who are female, the female
labor force participation rate, share of the state population living in an urban
area, share of state residents collecting welfare, share of singlemoms onwel-
fare, and the poverty rate.
Survey data on attitudes toward abortion, sex, marriage, welfare, and
women come from the General Social Survey (GSS). I include variables
from the GSS as controls in the analysis to lend further support that trends
in attitudes are not behind the main results on marriage and abortion. See
table B.1 (tables B.1–B.8, C.1–C.4, D.1–D.3 are available online) for further
details on the survey questions used with their full text and the years avail-
able. I restrict the data to survey respondents aged 18–44, since this is the
age group considered in the fertility and marriage analysis; I aggregate sur-
vey responses to the region-year level.28
I use data on the majority party of state legislatures and the party affilia-
tion of governors that were assembled by Halvorsen and Jakobsen (2013).
The data on state legislatures come from the National Conference of State
Legislatures, while the data on state governors are from the National Gov-
ernors Association. Table 2 summarizes the eight possible combinations of
Table 2 (Continued )
All
Years 1977–80 1981–84 1985–88 1989–92
R-D-D .02 .03 .01 .01 .02
(.13) (.17) (.08) (.10) (.14)
Other .00 .01 .00 .00 .00
(.05) (.09) (.00) (.00) (.06)
NOTE.—This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the Guttmacher data on
abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–44 and the number of abortion providers per 100,000 women. Societal
attitude data are from the GSS, for respondents aged 18–44. State legislature composition data comes from
Halvorsen and Jakobsen (2013). See app. B for GSS variable definitions.
28 State identifiers are not available in the public-use GSS data. Even with access
to state identifiers, however, sample sizes become too small: there are approximately
1,700 total responses per year over the 1977–92 period.
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party leadership (Democratic or Republican) of the state house, state senate,
and the governor’s office.29
V. Empirical Strategy
This section first explores determinants of state-level adoption of child
support statutes, presenting evidence that state-level characteristics are not
predictive of the timing and geography of statute adoption. I present evi-
dence that these laws indeed have had an effect on the likelihood of receiving
child support income. I then consider the effect of child support lawson state-
level abortion rates. Last, I present the main estimating equation for child
support’s effect on marriage, discuss the assumptions required for identifi-
cation, and present the results.
A. The Child Support Rollout
The empirical strategy of this paper is motivated by the idea that the exact
timing of pregnancy relative to the legislative regime is difficult for the in-
dividual to control. Identification in this setting nevertheless faces the chal-
lenge that state-level trends in supply and demand factors for marriage may
be correlated with the timing of states’ adoption of child support statutes,
which I explore now.
As a preliminary step, I regress the child support enforcement index de-
fined above on state fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-varying con-
trols that are likely to covarywithmarital attitudes ormarital opportunities.
These regressions are reported in table 3. I find that 91.7% of the variation
in the child support index can be attributed to time-invariant state effects
and common time effects (col. 1), while 0.03% of the variation in the child
support index can be attributed to time-varying factors (col. 2): welfare re-
cipiency rate, male unemployment rate, single mom share onwelfare, female
participation rate, female college share, percent black, urban share, poverty
rate, and college/high school premium. In column 2, an F-test of the null hy-
pothesis that these time-varying controls are jointly equal to zero rejects the
null at the 10% significance level (Fð7, 697Þ 5 1:92 with p 5:064), which
motivates the inclusion of these controls in the main analysis. I emphasize
that the main results change minimally with the inclusion of these controls.
Column 3 presents the long change of the state-level child support index
over the entire sample period regressed on baseline covariates. A joint test
of the null that the covariates are jointly equal to zero fails to reject (Fð7, 39Þ 5
1:05 with p 5 :412). Nevertheless, the potential for state trends over this pe-
riodmotivates the inclusion of state-level (or region-level) time trends as a ro-
bustness check later in the analysis.
29 The “other” category refers to states with independent governors. Nebraska
has a unicameral legislature, and its data are coded as having the same party affili-
ation for both the house and the senate.
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Next, I consider whether baseline state characteristics predict future in-
novations in child support laws. The idea here is that state-level variables,
including both outcomes of interest and controls, are correlated with sup-
ply and demand factors for marriage. If they predict future innovations in
the law, it would suggest either (1) a reverse causality story, inwhich changes
in fertility drive child support law adoption, or (2) a violation of the common
trends assumption, because baseline state characteristics are predictive of the
future path of their adoption of laws.
I estimate the following regression:
DCSst 5 a 1 w0tws,1977 1 hs 1 yt 1 est, (1)
where DCSst 5 CSst 2 CSs,t21 and ws,1977 is a vector of baseline state-level
outcome variables and controls, normalized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 in the baseline year. The vector ws,1977 includes the following:
the shotgun marriage rate, the abortion rate, the 10-year divorce hazard,
the black incarceration rate, the fraction black in the population, the male
unemployment rate, the share of college graduates who are female, the fe-
male participation rate, the share of urban residents, the fraction of the
Table 3
State-Year Characteristics and the Child Support Rollout
(1) (2) (3)
Percent black .020 .028
(.021) (.032)
Male unemployment rate .010** 2.074*
(.005) (.039)
Female college share 2.004 2.053*
(.004) (.028)
Female participation rate .001 2.049
(.010) (.038)
Welfare recipient .019** .020
(.007) (.042)
Welfare recipient (single mom) 2.002 2.008
(.006) (.037)
Poverty rate .006 2.016
(.010) (.035)
College premium 2.003 2.021
(.004) (.025)
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 768 768 48
R2 .917 .920 .176
NOTE.—This table presents regressions of the child support policy index on state and year fixed effects,
along with time-varying controls that are likely to covary with marital attitudes or marital opportunities. In
cols. 1 and 2 the dependent variable is CSst, and in col. 3 the dependent variable is CSs,1992 2 CSs,1977. Con-
trols are described in the text and are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across state-year
cells.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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population receiving welfare, the fraction of single moms on welfare, the
poverty rate, and the college/high school premium. The baseline year is 1977
for all variables in ws,1977 except, because of data limitations, for the black
incarceration rate, which has the baseline year 1980, and the abortion rate,
which has the baseline year 1978. The regression includes state fixed effects
and year fixed effects (hs and yt, respectively).
The estimates w^t can be interpreted as the effect of increasing by 1 stan-
dard deviation a state’s baseline level of a particular characteristic on a future
increase in the child support law index, net of the average state and time ef-
fects. Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients w^t and their associated 95%
confidence intervals. The first row of figure 5 shows that baseline levels of
the main outcome variables studied in this paper—the shotgun marriage
rate and the abortion rate—do not predict future innovations in child sup-
port laws and do not appear to be driving changes in child support statute
adoption.
The second and third rows of figure 5 show that baseline state-level con-
trols do not appear to predict future innovations nor time trends in the child
support law index. Female marital opportunities, which may be related to
the female labor force participation rate, the female share of college degree
holders, or the fraction of black men incarcerated, do not appear to predict
future changes in child support statute adoption.30 Taken as a whole, the pan-
els of figure 5 suggest that the timing of the rollout has no clear systematic
relationship with baseline state-level marital patterns or demographics. Ap-
pendix C explores this question further using the social attitudes data from
theGSS,finding that social attitudes do not correlate stronglywith law adop-
tion once we remove region and year fixed effects.
B. The Effect of Child Support Laws on Income
This section aims to show that child support laws at the time of pregnancy
indeed have an effect on future child support income for single moms.
I restrict the analysis to the population of never-marriedmothers who re-
port having a custodial child in the household under 18 years of age andwho
also report the father living outside the household. I then estimate the fol-
lowing regression:
Incist 5 b0 1 b1CSs,t2a21 1 g0xist 1 a0wst 1 eist, (2)
30 Certain variables, such as the share receiving welfare, the poverty rate, and the
share of single moms receiving welfare, are borderline statistically significant in
years 1986–87. To formally test significance, I perform an F-test of each variable’s
year coefficients being jointly equal to zero and report the results in table B.2. In
none of the cases do we reject the F-test of equality at the 10% significance level.
I also fail to reject an F-test of all variables’ year coefficients being jointly equal
to zero.
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where Incist is an indicator taking a value of 1 if person i receives any child
support income in year t;CSs,t2a21 represents the child support law index at
time t 2 a 2 1, where t is the survey year and a is the age of her youngest
child; and s is the state of residence.31 The state of residence at the time of
the survey is assumed to be the state of residence at the time of the youngest
child’s birth (an assumption explored in app. B). The vector xist represents
FIG. 5.—Child support legislation changes regressed on baseline state character-
istics, 1977–92. I regress changes in the child support index on state-specific base-
line characteristics interacted with time dummies, controlling for state and time
fixed effects. The graphs plot estimates w^t from the regression equation DCSst 5
a 1 w0tws,1977 1 hs 1 yt 1 est. The vector ws,1977 are baseline (1977) characteristics
from each state (except for the black incarceration rate, for which the baseline year
is 1980, and the abortion rate, for which the baseline year is 1978), and DCSst 5
CSst 2 CSs,t21. Each ws,1977 is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation
1. A color version of this figure is available online.
31 I use the age of the youngest child because child support laws have strength-
ened over time, and these laws are most likely to impact child support receipt in the
case of a mother’s most recent child.
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individual controls, including age, age squared, age at the time of first birth,
race indicators, dummies for three education categories (high school degree,
some college, and college degree or more), and number of children dummies;
wst is a vector of state-year controls; and eist is an error term representing the
unobserveddeterminants of child support receipt. Throughout the paper, stan-
dard errors are clustered at the state level andare robust toheteroskedasticity.
In this regressionwe expect the sign of b1 to be positive, indicating that the
adoption of a child support lawhas a positive effect on the fraction ofwomen
reporting child support income receipt. Table 4 indicates that this is indeed
the case. Since the child support index is constructed with nine laws, we can
interpret the coefficient as representing the effect of moving from a regime
Table 4
Child Support Laws’ Effect on Child Support Receipt (1977–92)
Any Child Support Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child support law index .128*** .140*** .053*** .052*** .054*** .053**
(.018) (.014) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.020)
Age at survey .029*** .029*** .022*** .022*** .022*** .021***
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
Age at first birth 2.005*** 2.005*** 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
African American 2.050*** 2.068*** 2.065*** 2.065*** 2.065*** 2.065***
(.013) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
Other race/ethnicity 2.039* 2.031 2.033* 2.032* 2.023 2.027
(.020) (.020) (.019) (.019) (.018) (.020)
High school degree .056*** .049*** .050*** .049*** .050*** .049***
(.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.008)
Some college .077*** .078*** .075*** .075*** .075*** .077***
(.010) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
College degree .097*** .097*** .094*** .094*** .093*** .091***
(.014) (.013) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
State-year controls Yes Yes
Baseline controls  t Yes
State-year fixed effects Yes
Observations 24,565 24,565 24,565 24,219 22,776 24,565
R2 .036 .053 .058 .058 .059 .116
Mean of dependent variable .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17
NOTE.—The sample is from the March Current Population Survey and is restricted to never-married
mothers between 17 and 60 with a child 18 years or less in the household whose father is reported absent
from the household. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the mother receives any child sup-
port income at time t. The right-hand-side variable of interest is an index of child support laws in the moth-
er’s state in the year prior to the birth year of the youngest child, where the index is constructed using the
Case-McLanahan data, 1977–92. Controls included but not reported are as follows: age, age squared, age at
birth, race dummies, education dummies, and number of children dummies. Column 6 includes interacted
state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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with none of the laws in place to one with all nine laws on the probability of
receiving child support income. These laws increased the probability of child
support receipt by 5.3%, as shown in the specification with state and year
fixed effects (col. 3). Adding additional time-varying state controls (col. 4)
and baseline (1977) state-level controls interacted with time trend (col. 5) do
not reduce the magnitude of the laws’ effect. Given that the fraction of the
sample reporting child support income is 17%, the magnitude of the laws’
cumulative effect is quite large.
Wemight be concerned that states that adopt stronger child support laws
have a population of individuals more likely to comply with such laws; in
this case, b1 may reflect state-year-specific attitudes toward the legal system
or child support laws rather than the effect of the laws per se. Because there
is variation within state-year cells in the age of the youngest child, it is pos-
sible to include interacted state-year fixed effects, which controls for state-
level time trends in attitudes toward child support that might lead to greater
compliance. The identifying variation in this specification is variation in laws
at the time of birth of the youngest child within a state-year cell, and the
estimated effect is quite similar, reported in column 6 of table 4. Other co-
efficients may be of interest as well: from table 4 we see that older, higher
educated, and nonminority mothers are more likely to report having re-
ceived child support income.
How much income did the laws generate for single-mom households?
We saw in figure 2 that conditional on receiving any child support income,
the average amount received per never-married mother is between $2,000
and $3,000, valued in 2000 USD. However, there may be some crowd-out
in public assistance income due to policies limiting the pass-through of child
support for women receiving public benefits (Cancian and Meyer 2005). In
table B.4, I explore the crowd-out of public assistance and Supplemental Se-
curity Income receipt for theMarchCPS sample of never-marriedmothers. I
find that the child support rollout reduced average per-person public assis-
tance from the government by $250–$500 annually (also in 2000USD).Hence,
the net benefit of child support is still large as a percentage of income.32
C. Abortion
In this section I consider the effect of the child support rollout on the
abortion rate. Themechanism highlighted in the model is that child support
reduces the financial burden of raising a child as a single mom, and women
32 About 15% of child support recipients receive AFDC or Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF), and this fraction has remained relatively stable
over the sample period (Cancian and Meyer 2005). Note that crowd-out of public
assistance will take place only during the time the mother is eligible for and receiv-
ing AFDC/TANF, while single mothers may receive child support throughout the
child’s first 18 years, and sometimes longer.
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will abort fewer pregnancies as a result. Note that abortion became legal in
all US states several years before the child support rollout, following the
1973 Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade.
The dependent variable used in the regression analysis that follows is the
state-year abortion rate, which is defined as the total number of abortions
per 1,000 women aged 15–44.33 I estimate the following regression:
ast 5 b0 1 b1CSst 1 g0wst 1 est: (3)
All specifications include both state and year fixed effects. Cells are
weighted by the state’s population of 15–44-year-old women. A potential
source of bias in estimating equation (3) is that trends in state-level attitudes
toward abortion may be correlated with the pattern of the child support
rollout. To mitigate this concern, I include a proxy for societal attitudes to-
ward abortion using data from the GSS, which is the principal factor from a
factor analysis of the nine abortion-related questions in the GSS and is ag-
gregated to the region-year level.34 Because of gap years in both the Gutt-
macher and GSS data and to prevent the regressions from dropping obser-
vations due tomissing data, I impute values for gap years using themidpoint
of the lead and lag values for each state-year.35
Table 5, columns 1–4, presents the main results, adding additional con-
trols in each successive column. The full set of child support laws adopted
over the 1978–92 period is associated with a decline in the abortion rate by
1.8–3.1, off a base of 27.6. The preferred specification is column 4, which in-
cludes controls for abortion attitudes, state-year controls, and baseline state
controls interacted with a linear time trend. Over the sample period 1978–
92, the mean policy index increased by .637. If we scale the point estimate
(which represents a change from 0 to 1 in the policy index) by the actual
growth in the policy index over this period, the effect size ranges from 1.15
to 1.97.
Themagnitude of the estimates in columns 1–4 implies that the child sup-
port rollout led to a decline in abortions by 4%–7%over the sample period,
suggesting that child support legislation has played a significant role in the
recentdecline of abortions in theUnited States.Toprovide a senseof themag-
nitude, the abortion rate—that is, the number of abortions per 1,000women
aged 15–44—declined roughly 2.5 over the 1978–92 period, meaning that
child support can account formore than 46%of the decline over this period.
33 Using the log total abortions as the dependent variable produces similar results.
34 The societal attitudes factor correlates strongly with the number of abortion
providers per capita, which can be seen formally in table B.3. This correlation with
an objective measure of abortion availability suggests that the GSS survey data rep-
resent a meaningful proxy for abortion attitudes.
35 The estimates are not sensitive to this imputation, and the results from the es-
timation of eq. (3) with nonimputed data are presented in table B.7.
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Wemight be concerned that trends in abortion availability are somehow
correlatedwith trends in the child support rollout. For this reason, I control
for the number of abortion providers per 100,000 women aged 15–44 in the
state-year in the column 5 specification. Its inclusion does not affect the
results.36
Column 6 includes interactions between region and each year separately;
this specification allows for heterogeneity across regions in the time path of
abortion rates. The standard errors increase as the regression loses power,
and the coefficient on the child support index loses statistical significance
at the 10% level. However, the point estimate changes only slightly, sug-
gesting that a spurious correlation between region-specific trends in abor-
tion rates and the time path of child support law adoption is not driving the
main estimates presented in columns 1–4. In addition, an F-test of the null
hypothesis that all interactions between region and year dummies are jointly
equal to zero fails to reject the null (Fð8, 47Þ 5 1:06 and p 5 :41).
As an additional check, in section C.4 of appendix C I present a placebo
exercise that explores whether future changes in child support laws predict
current abortion rates. I reestimate equation (3) and include an additional
control for the future change in CSst. I find that future changes in the law
do not affect current abortion rates and that themain estimates are unaffected
Table 5
Effect of Child Support Laws on Abortions (1978–92)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child support index 2.3.059** 22.956** 22.571** 21.855** 22.059* 21.802
(1.270) (1.254) (1.135) (.915) (1.048) (1.124)
Abortion attitudes control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls  t Yes Yes Yes
Abortion providers control Yes
Region  t Yes
Number of observations 720 720 720 720 720 720
R2 .979 .979 .979 .981 .982 .981
Mean of dependent variable 27.55 27.55 27.55 27.55 27.55 27.55
NOTE.—The dependent variable is number of abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–44, regressed on the
child support law index. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. The abortion attitudes con-
trol is the principal factor from a factor analysis of the nine abortion-related questions in the General Social
Survey, aggregated to the region-year level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
36 Including abortion providers in the regression has the advantage of controlling
for a proxy measure of cost, as it captures the availability of abortions represented
by the density of clinics in a state-year. Its inclusion, however, has the disadvantage
of introducing a classic supply-demand endogeneity, because abortion providers
may respond to unobserved shocks to demand captured by the error term. Hence,
for all but col. 5 I omit this control.
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by the inclusion of this control; I interpret these results as evidence against
reverse causality driving the results in this section.
Bounding Selection Bias
The empirical results on fertility presented above suggest that child sup-
port lawsmay have reduced the probability of a nonmarital pregnancy. Any
pregnancies that are not occurring may have higher or lower abortion rates
than those that do occur. We might think, for instance, that child support
reduces pregnancy among women most likely to abort, which would lead
us to overstate the effect of the policy on abortion rates.
I perform pessimistic counterfactual scenarios to examine the extent of
this bias and report these in table 6. As in the selection counterfactuals for
marriage performed above, I assume that the full rollout of child support
laws reduced total pregnancies by 2%. I subsequently assign higher and
higher abortion rates to these pregnancies, ranging from the 50th percentile
to the 90th percentile in the initial year’s state-level distribution.37 Under the
counterfactual scenario in which these nonoccurring pregnancies have the
90th percentile of abortion rates, the estimate loses statistical significance
at the 10% level. Hence, the negative effect on fertility would have to con-
sist of women with some of the highest abortion rates for the results to
disappear.
Table 6
Bounding Selection: Counterfactuals Using Nonpregnancies
due to Child Support
Baseline
Percentile of Abortion Rate Assigned
to Nonpregnancies
Median 60th 70th 80th 90th
Child support index 22.571** 22.129* 22.062* 22.043* 22.001* 21.859
(1.135) (1.138) (1.139) (1.139) (1.140) (1.141)
Abortion attitudes control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 720 716 716 716 716 716
R2 .979 .979 .979 .979 .979 .979
Mean of dependent variable 27.55 27.55 27.55 27.55 27.55 27.55
NOTE.—This table assigns counterfactual abortion rates to pregnancies that are not observed in the data
due to a direct effect of child support on fertility. These pregnancies are assigned abortion probabilities at
the percentile (indicated at each column) in the initial (1978) state-level distribution. The baseline specifi-
cation comes from table 5, col. 3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
37 The expression for the imputed abortion rate is a^ st 5 ast 1 ð:02  CSst 
birthss,1978ÞðaðpÞ1978  ð1=birthss,1978ÞÞ. The first term is the observed abortion rate, i.e.,
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D. The Effect of Child Support Laws on the Marriage Decision
Because SIPP contains retrospective marital and fertility histories, we can
construct a panel at the individual level, which we can use to identify the ef-
fect of child support laws on the probability of never-married women be-
coming married. The unit of observation is a person-year, and I restrict the
sample to include women between ages 18 and 44.
To avoid overweighting individuals who appear in the sample a greater
number times, I weight each observation by their SIPP person weight mul-
tiplied by the reciprocal of the number of total observations for that person
in the regression sample, so that each person’s observation weights sum to
her SIPP person weight. (This reweighting has a relatively minor effect on
the estimates, and the unweighted regressions are reported in table B.5.) The
main estimating equation is
marry1stist 5 b0 1 b1nmpregist 1 b2nmpregist
 CSst 1 b3CSst 1 g0xist 1 eist, (4)
where nmpregist is an indicator for never-married woman i becoming preg-
nant with her first-born child in year t. The variablemarry1stist is an indica-
tor for person i becoming married for the first time in either year t or year
t 1 1. The variable CSst represents the child support enforcement measure
for state s in year t.38 The vector of individual controls xist includes a high
school completion dummy, race dummies, age dummies, and SIPP sample
year dummies. I omit higher education categories from the regression con-
trols because the decision to get married may affect educational attainment,
and their inclusion would introduce a simultaneity bias. All specifications
include statefixed effects and yearfixed effects, which remove state and year
means in the propensity to marry.
The coefficient b1 in equation (4) represents the effect of having a non-
marital pregnancy in year t on the individual’s decision to getmarried in year
t or t 1 1 relative to thosewho are not pregnant (orwhomiscarry or have an
abortion). The coefficient of interest is b2, which represents the difference in
difference: the effect of strengthened child support enforcement onmarriage
total abortions per 1,000 women in state-year st. The second term is the selection
term: total pregnancies unobserved due to the policy (proxied with births) multiplied
by the number of abortions per pregnancy (again proxied with births), expressed per
1,000 women. The term aðpÞ1978 indicates the percentile p in the 1978 state-level distri-
bution used to compute the counterfactual.
38 The respondent’s state of residence at the time of the survey is assumed to be
her state of residence in each year of the panel. This assumption requires there to be
no selective migration by women who have a nonmarital pregnancy based on states’
child support laws. I check this assumption in table B.8 and find no evidence for
selective migration.
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for womenwho face a nonmarital pregnancy relative to womenwho do not,
relative to this difference under weakened child support enforcement.
Without the inclusion of interaction terms between nmpregist and state,
nmpregist and xist, and nmpregist and year, the identification assumption is
that the propensity tomarry following a nonmarital pregnancy does not vary
with state, demographics, or year. This assumption can be relaxed by includ-
ing the full set of interactions, and these specifications are reported in the
main results table.However, the considerable number of interactions results
in a loss of degrees of freedom, and, as will be seen in the next section, the
main effect, while remaining similar in magnitude, loses statistical signifi-
cance in the most flexible specification. For this reason, in the baseline re-
gressions I rely on the stronger identifying assumption, but in the interest
of both completeness and transparency I report the specifications requiring
weaker assumptions.
Assessing the Difference-in-Differences Design
The difference-in-differences design is motivated by the idea that after
controlling for state and time effects, the precise timing and geography of
the rollout of child support laws are uncorrelated with unobserved determi-
nants of individual choices regarding marriage and fertility.
There are three main challenges for identification in this setting. The first
is reverse causality: that changes in unobserved attitudes regardingmarriage
and fertility may be a driving force behind child support statute adoption.
For example, a declining attitude toward marriage may affect the desire to
have stronger protections for children of unmarried couples and therefore
lead to stronger child support enforcement. I present empirical evidence in
section V.A (above) against this hypothesis. As a second check, I estimate a
placebo regression that adds interactions between pregnancy and changes in
a state’s future child support law. This specification tests whether current
marital choices predict future changes in child support, as they would if the
reverse causality story were in effect. This exercise is discussed in section C.2
of appendix C, and the results are reported in table C.2. I do not find evidence
in favor of reverse causality.
The second concern for identification is that of omitted variables: if state-
level time trends such as expandedwork opportunities forwomen or the ab-
sence of marriageable men due to incarceration affects both marriage rates
and trends in child support legislation, the main estimates will be biased. To
mitigate the concern that the estimated effect is driven by unobservables, I
report results with and without a large set of time-varying controls. First, I
control directly for societal attitudes at the region-year level, which proxy
for public sentiment on issues including premarital sex, sex education, abor-
tion, and the generosity of public assistance. Next, I add time-varying state
controls, including percent black in the population, the male unemployment
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rate, the share of college graduateswho are female, the female labor force par-
ticipation rate, urban share of households, share of welfare recipiency, share
of singlemoms onwelfare, and the share of people below 100%of the federal
poverty line. Third, I show that the estimates are robust to specifications al-
lowing for differential time trends related to baseline state-level characteris-
tics. Fourth, I show that the estimates are robust to the inclusion of interacted
state-year fixed effects, along with interactions of all right-hand-side vari-
ables with state dummies and time dummies. This last specification relies on
variation across women in pregnancy status within state-year cells and has
the advantage of holding fixed all state-level time-varying determinants of
marriage thatmay be correlatedwith the timing of child support enactments.
All of these specifications are presented in the main results table, for ease of
comparison across specifications.
The third challenge for identification is that the timing of pregnancy is to
some extent a choice, as is explicitly captured in the model of section III.
Hence, equation (4) faces a selection concern. I defer this discussion until
section V.D, after presenting estimates of the direct effect of child support
enforcement on fertility. For now, it is worth emphasizing that in order to
give the estimates of equation (4) a causal interpretation, we must assume
that child support laws do not cause differential selection into pregnancy
based on underlying propensity to marry. In the model of section III, in-
deed there is differential selection based on propensity to marry, but the se-
lection works against finding a negative coefficient b2: couples who are least
likely to marry decrease their fertility the most, implying that a selection ef-
fect would make child support appear to increase the propensity to marry.
Event Study Illustration
Figure 6 provides a graphical depiction of the identification strategy, rep-
resented as an event study. Since the child support index is a continuous var-
iable, it is useful to recenter the data so that time 0 represents the biggest
change in the child support index for each state after removing state and year
fixed effects.We then plot the outcome variables and controls relative to this
“event.” All figures discussed here include only the sample of states (35 of
48) for which we can construct a balanced time series of 3 years before and
after the biggest change, so that changes in the series are not drivenby changes
in the composition of states included in the sample. Figureswithout this com-
positional adjustment look very similar and are presented in appendix B. The
child support series of all panels of figure 6 show a sharp increase in the child
support residual between time 21 and 0.39
39 Note that what appears to be a decline in the child support index approaching
year 0 is a consequence of the regression mechanics, which forces the residuals to
sum to zero across time periods.
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To construct the shotgunmarriage series, depicted infigure 6B, I regress a
marriage dummy (equal to 1 if the person marries in the current year or the
next year) on a pregnancy dummy, along with state and year fixed effects
and individual controls (race dummies, age, age squared, and a high school
FIG. 6.—Event study illustration of the difference-in-differences design. A pre-
sents the first stage as an event study. For each state I recenter the data so that both
cause and effect occur at time 0. For the child support policy index (right Y-axis),
time 0 represents the year with the strongest growth in the policy index in each
state, after removing state and year fixed effects. For the child support income series
(left Y-axis), I regress the probability of receiving child support on controls, with
state and survey year fixed effects. I then plot the mean residuals in the recentered
year, where year 0 represents the year after the policy change. B and C present the
policy index series, constructed exactly as inA. For the marriage series and abortion
series, time 0 represents the year after the biggest change in the policy index. The
marriage series (B) is constructed as follows: in each recentered year, I regress the
marriage dummy on a dummy for pregnancy and controls for the sample of women
who experience a nonmarital pregnancy; the graph plots the coefficients in each
recentered year. C plots mean residuals, in each recentered year, from a regression
of the abortion rate on state and year fixed effects. The range of the right Y-axis is
1 standard deviation of the child support index; the range of the left Y-axis is 1 stan-
dard deviation of the abortion rate variable. The panels include 35 out of 48 states for
whichwe can construct a balanced sample 3 years before and after the biggest jump in
the legal index. A color version of this figure is available online.
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degree dummy), separately in each “recentered” year. The regression sam-
ple includes women in the 18–44 age cohort whose first pregnancy was out-
side marriage. I then plot the coefficient estimate on the pregnancy dummy
in each year, so that time 0 represents the year after the biggest jump in child
support residual. We see from the figure that the increase in the child sup-
port law index from year 21 to 0 is associated with a substantial decline in
the probability of marriage following a nonmarital pregnancy.
To construct the abortion series, presented in figure 6C, I first remove
year and state fixed effects from the abortion rate. I then plot the mean of
these residuals in each recentered year. Again, for the abortion rate series,
time 0 represents 1 year after the biggest jump in the child support law index
(stripped of state and year fixed effects). The figure shows a decline in the
abortion rate following an increase in child support enforcement, support-
ing the findings of section V.C.40
We can contrast figure 6 with event study plots using control variables.
The research design requires no sharp changes in unobserved determinants
of shotgun marriages around the “event.” If, for example, sharp changes in
female labor market opportunities took place at the same time as the child
support rollout, we would be concerned about omitted variables. Figure 7
depicts the event study with several other variables on the left Y-axis, after
removing state and year fixed effects: the female labor force participation
rate, the female college share, the fraction of residents on welfare, and the
fraction of residents below the 100% federal poverty line. Note that there
do not appear to be any sharp changes around the biggest change in child
support laws. This is reassuring, and it lends support to the research design,
which requires common trends in unobserved determinants of shotgunma-
rriages. Similar pictures for additional controls and for the GSS societal at-
titudes data are presented in figures B.2 and B.3 (figs. B.1–B.5 are available
online).
Marriage Results
Table 7 reports the results from the estimation of equation (4). Column 1
reports estimates using state and yearfixed effects.Column 2 includes region-
year societal attitudes controls, including the principal factor from a factor
analysis of the nine abortion-related questions in the GSS and four additional
variables controlling for attitudes toward federal welfare, sex education, di-
vorce, and premarital sex. Column 3 includes additional state-year controls.
Column 4 includes baseline (1977) controls (including societal attitude con-
trols) interacted with linear time trends. The results are remarkably stable
40 Note that the child support series in fig. 6B is slightly different from its coun-
terpart in fig. 6C. The reason is that the abortion data has gap years, and hence the
variation in the child support series used for identification is slightly different for
the two outcome variables.
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across specifications. In the first four columns, the coefficient on the in-
teraction term nmpregist  CSst is negative and significant, with estimates
between 2.117 and 2.120. These coefficients indicate that a woman who
has a nonmarital pregnancy in a state-year that has all child support laws
in place compared with a nonmarital pregnancy in a state-year with none
is about 12 percentage points less likely to have a shotgun marriage. These
estimates are relative to a 38% baseline likelihood of becoming married in
the same year or in the year following a nonmarital pregnancy, which can
be seen in the coefficient in the second row.
Note that the regressions in columns 1–4 do not include interactions be-
tween nmpregist and state, xist, or year. This means that these regressions are
estimated under the assumption that the propensity to marry following a
nonmarital pregnancy does not vary with state, xist, or year after condition-
ing on controls.
Column 5 reports the results including interactions between nmpregist
and state dummies and between nmpregist and xist, flexibly allowing for
women in different states and demographics to have different propensities
to marry following a nonmarital pregnancy. The point estimate is 2.154
FIG. 7.—Event study illustration: other variables. This figure repeats the exercise
of figure 6 with alternative state-level variables depicted on the left Y-axis. The
range of the left Y-axis is 2 standard deviations of the left Y-axis variable. FPL 5


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and is significant at the 1% level. Column 6 adds an interaction between
nmpregist and a linear time trend; the point estimate is 2.145, and the esti-
mate remains significant at the 10% level. The point estimate diminishes
only slightly, mitigating concern for bias due to a violation of common
trends. Note that the coefficient estimate on nmpregist  t is quite small in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. This economically small effect size
lends support to the prior specifications that assume propensity to marry
evolves in the same way for women who are pregnant and those who are
not.
Column 7 adds interactions between nmpregist and all year dummies,flex-
ibly allowing for propensity tomarry following a pregnancy to varywith each
year in the sample. The regression loses considerable power and the stan-
dard errors become large. The main effect is no longer significant, but the
effect size remains similar in magnitude at 2.143. An F-test of the null hy-
pothesis that all interactions between nmpregist and year dummies are jointly
equal to zero fails to reject the null (Fð20, 40Þ 5 1:458 and p 5 :170), miti-
gating concern that the main estimate is driven by time trends in the propen-
sity to marry following a pregnancy.
Column 8 restricts the sample to pregnancy-year observations, meaning I
restrict the sample to observations with nmpreg 5 1. By restricting to these
observations, we are effectively allowing state and time trends in the pro-
pensity to marry following a nonmarital pregnancy. The coefficient on the
interaction term—reported in the top row for ease of comparison with the
estimates in other columns—remains negative, but the standard errors are
quite large, and in this specification we fail to reject a null effect.
Taken together, the results suggest that moving from a regime with none
of the child support laws in place to one with all of them in place leads to
about a 12 percentage point reduction in the shotgun marriage rate, off a
base of 38%. Over the sample period, the policy index increased from an
average of .13 (in 1977) to .79 (in 1992). Scaling the column 3 point estimate
by the actual growth in the policy index over this period delivers an effect
size of :117  ð:79 2 :13Þ 5 :077 percentage points. This effect size is quite
large relative to the ∼10-point decline in the shotgun marriage rate over the
1977–92 sample period.41
The magnitude of the estimated effect may appear large given the sub-
stantial amount of nonpayment of child support. It is worth pausing to re-
41 Table B.6 examines heterogeneity by the type of policy adopted, reestimating
eq. (4) and replacing the policy index with a separate indicator for each policy and
replacing the policy index interaction term with interactions of each policy with the
pregnancy indicator. The policies that are statistically and economically significant
are the genetic testing and wage-withholding provisions. Less important policies
for the marriage decision are penalties for failure to pay (such as allowing liens on
property).
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flect on the plausibility of such large effects. First, it is important to note that
the effect can be large due to a substantial number of couples on the margin
of indifference between marriage and remaining single; in this case, a small
reward for not marrying can have a substantial effect on aggregate marriage
rates. The marriage decision following a nonmarital pregnancy was chosen
for this analysis precisely because they aremarginal marriages inwhich cou-
ples are likely to exhibit a high elasticity with respect to marital incentives.
Second, the estimates reported here are consistent with what other authors
have reported; for example, Rossin-Slater (2017) studies in-hospital volun-
tary paternity establishments and finds that for each additional paternity es-
tablished there are 0.13 fewer parental marriages after childbirth. In addi-
tion, if paternity establishment gives fathers greater custodial rights outside
marriage, as discussed in appendix A, marriage decisions may be affected
even if a large fraction of established fathers are subsequently delinquent
on payments.
Marriage Results: Selection into Fertility
Let us now return to the discussion of selection into fertility raised in sec-
tion V.D. To restate the selection issue, it is plausible that child support af-
fects only fertility and not marriage; under this interpretation, the effects on
marriage observed in section V.D occur because individuals who are most
affected in their fertility also happen to be those most likely to marry fol-
lowing a pregnancy.
First, it should be noted that the literature has found that young and low-
educatedmen andwomen reduce their fertility themost in response to child
support legislation, while older andmore educated individuals have little re-
sponse (Aizer and McLanahan 2006; Plotnick et al. 2007). But older and
higher-educated men and women have far higher rates of shotgun marriage
than those who are younger and less educated, meaning selection works
against finding a negative effect of child support on marriage. The theoret-
ical model in this paper supports the prior literature: couples who are least
likely to marry reduce their fertility the most, again suggesting that the em-
pirical effects estimated onmarriage in section V.D are a lower bound of the
true effect.
To examine the sensitivity of themarriage estimates to selection bias, I fol-
low Bharadwaj, Loken, andNeilson (2013) and perform an exercise that of-
fers pessimistic counterfactual scenarios; these results are reported in table 8.
To construct the counterfactuals, I begin by assuming that the full rollout of
child support laws reduced total pregnancies by 2%, a large effect. Next, I
impute “excess births” that would have occurred absent the policy. Specif-
ically, I impute an additional DCSst  :02 births to single women in each
state-year: these are the births that are not observed due to the policy change
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under the selection story.42 I then randomly assign higher and higher shot-
gun marriage rates to these imputed births—60%, 70%, and so on—and
reestimate the main specification of the marriage regression (col. 3 of ta-
ble 7). The exercise shows that even when imputing large selection effects,
themain effect onmarriage is only slightlydiminished.Evenunder the coun-
terfactual scenario in which these nonoccurring pregnancies have 90%mar-
riage rates, the estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level. The
point estimates remain consistent with the interpretation that child support
has reduced marriage following a nonmarital pregnancy.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents both a model and empirical evidence to understand
the effect of child support policies on selection into marriage and fertility.
The model shows that child support enforces commitment from men to
future transfers in the event of a child and crowds out the commitment role
Table 8
Placing Bounds on Selection: Counterfactuals Using Nonpregnancies
due to Child Support
Baseline
(1)










Nonmarital pregnancy  child
support index 2.117*** 2.112*** 2.112*** 2.111** 2.111**
(.040) (.039) (.040) (.042) (.041)
Nonmarital pregnancy .380*** .379*** .380*** .382*** .387***
(.021) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.021)
Child support index .009 .009* .010* .010* .010*
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Societal attitudes controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of individuals 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000
R2 .070 .071 .071 .072 .072
Mean of dependent variable .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
NOTE.—This table assigns counterfactual marriage rates to pregnancies that are not observed in the data
due to a direct effect of child support on fertility. I start by assuming that the full child support rollout re-
duced nonmarital births by 2%. I then impute an additional DCSst  :02 births to single women in each
state-year. These pregnancies are randomly assigned marriage rates indicated at each column heading. The re-
gression specification comes from table 7, col. 3, and all columns follow this specification. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
42 Note that DCSst  :02 is the appropriate fraction since it implies, once we sum
over the years, that the full rollout would have affected fertility rates by a fraction
Σ1992t51972DCSst  :02 5 :02  ðCSs,1992 2 CSs,1992Þ in each state.
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ofmarriage. Child support also reduces abortions because of the diminished
cost of raising the child as a single mom. The empirical evidence uses vari-
ation in the state-year rollout of child support laws over the 1977–92 period
relative to the timing of nonmarital pregnancy; I show that the rollout led to
a reduction in the probability of having a shotgun marriage and a decline in
the abortion rate.
The main takeaway is that child support laws, which are intended to en-
sure that the noncustodial parent contributes to child-rearing, have impor-
tant consequences for selection into fertility and marriage. The magnitudes
estimated in this paper suggest that the increase in child support enforce-
ment can account for a substantial part of the long-run decline of shotgun
marriages and part of the recent fall in the abortion rate. Child support laws
are thus central to understanding major trends in marriage and fertility in
the second half of the 20th century, during which child support enforce-
ment went from virtual nonexistence to automatic and near universal.
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